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Introduction 
 
Successive UK governments, in the neo-liberal era, have instituted market 
mechanisms within the NHS and increasingly afforded private healthcare companies 
with opportunities to deliver clinical services. Such reforms divert resources away from 
patient needs to bureaucracies (required to administer the quasi-markets that have 
been instituted within the NHS) and the coffers of private companies. In fragmenting 
provision, they also undermine risk pooling and cross subsidy within the NHS. Such 
governments have sought to naturalise their reforms by adopting many of the 
strategies of depoliticisation delineated by Bob Jessop (2015). The strategies of 
juridification (the increase of formal law) and new constitutionalism (transnational legal 
rules which restrict national policymaking to the model of liberal democratic capitalism) 
are examined within this article. While the NHS has become increasingly juridified 
(laws increasingly regulate the behaviour of NHS actors and are increasingly resolving 
disputes), it also appears to have been increasingly politicised as is indicated by the 
activities of campaign groups, such as the largest rally in NHS history (against cuts 
and privatisation) in London in March 2017. In addition, search results of the 
newspaper database Proquest European Newsstream and Hansard (transcripts of 
parliamentary debates) suggest a heightened awareness of the potential for 
transnational laws to constrain NHS policymaking. In chronicling the frustrated efforts 
of the strategies of juridification and new constitutionalism to naturalise market reforms 
to the English NHS, this article reveals that the solidarity that was important in the 
creation of the NHS endures (although the institutions discharging this principle are 
being undermined through inadequate funding and privatisation) and limits to neo-
liberal hegemony.   
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Depoliticisation 
 
There are many ways of conceiving neo-liberalism. Marxists regard neo-liberalism as 
WKH FXUUHQW KHJHPRQLF LGHRORJ\ DQG D FODVV SURMHFW WR µµUHVWRUH DQG FRQVROLGDWH
capiWDOLVWFODVVSRZHU¶¶+DUYH\)RXFDXOGLDQVFKRODUVUHJDUGQHR-liberalism 
as a political rationality which seeks to extend the model of homo-economicus (the 
PDQ RI H[FKDQJH µµWR HYHU\ VRFLDO DFWRU LQ JHQHUDO¶¶ )RXFDXOW   7KH
ideology, or political rationality, of neo-liberalism became dominant after the post 
Second World War social democratic consensus disintegrated, due to economic 
crises, in the 1970s. Neo-liberals idealise markets as the best means of allocating 
resources and ensuring individual freedom (Turner 2008: 4). This idealisation of 
markets explains the market reforms to public services, such as the NHS, within the 
neo-liberal era. In addition, private companies have pressurised governments to 
marketise and privatise healthcare, which is attractive to them as demand appears to 
be insatiable and the state is a guarantor of profit (McKinley 1984: 5). However, as 
Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham (1994: 102) note, the translation of political rationalities, 
such as neo-liberalism, into practice, involves attempt, incompleteness and 
resistance.   
 
Governments within the neo-liberal era have attempted to naturalise their reforms by 
endeavouring to remove them from political contestation. Anita Chari (2015) argues 
that, at the most basic leYHOµµQHR-OLEHUDOGRPLQDWLRQLV«DIRUPRIGHSROLWLFLVDWLRQ¶¶S
22). Bob Jessop (2015) has identified several depoliticising strategies on the levels of 
3 
 
polity, politics and policy. The strategies considered within this article are juridification, 
which Jessop states is a means of redrawing the boundary between the political and 
the non-political (depolitization) (p. 101), and new constitutionalism (a means of 
depoliticalization) (p. 104). Such concepts are clarified in the following paragraphs and 
utilised within the rest of the article to assess whether efforts to depoliticise market 
reforms to the English NHS have succeeded. In demonstrating the apparent failure of 
such strategies to naturalize market reforms to English healthcare, this article reveals 
limits to neo-liberal hegemony and the endurance of solidarity concerning healthcare. 
 
Juridification 
 
The concept of juridification was popularised by Jurgen Habermas. Habermas (2006) 
XVHGWKHFRQFHSWWRUHIHUWRWKHJHQHUDOWHQGHQF\µµWRZDUGDQLQFUHDVH in formal (or 
SRVLWLYHZULWWHQODZWKDWFDQEHREVHUYHGLQPRGHUQVRFLHW\¶¶S-XULGLILFDWLRQ
was viewed as a legal problem by Habermas, but many other scholars regard it as a 
political problem (Veitch et al 2012: 260). For example, the concept was first used by 
2WWR .LUFKKLHPHU  WR GHVFULEH ODERXU GLVSXWHV WKDW KDG EHHQ µµIRUPDOL]HG
MXULGLFDOO\ DQG WKHUHE\ QHXWUDOL]HG¶¶ S  6LPLODUO\ %RDYHQWXUD GH 6RXVD 6DQWRV
FRQWHQGVWKDWMXULGLILFDWLRQLQYROYHVWKHUHFHGLQJRISROLWLFVDVµµWKe protection 
of more and more social interests became a function of technically minded legal 
H[SHUWVUDWKHUWKDQRISROLWLFDOPRELOL]DWLRQDQGSROLWLFDOOHYHUDJH¶¶S+DEHUPDV
 LGHQWLILHG µµIRXUHSRFKDO MXULGLILFDWLRQSURFHVVHV¶¶S7KH first led to the 
bourgeois state, in which the state and the economy were differentiated and the 
concept of the legal person was created (pp. 357-358). The second led to the 
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FRQVWLWXWLRQDOVWDWH¶¶SLQZKLFKWKHVWDWHZDVFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHGWKURXJK the rule 
of law (p. 359). The third led to the democratic constitutional state (p. 357), in which 
µµFRQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HGVWDWHSRZHUZDVGHPRFUDWL]HG¶¶S7KHIRXUWKZDYHOHGWRWKH
µµGHPRFUDWLF ZHOIDUH VWDWH¶¶ S  +DEHUPDV FRQWHQGHG WKDW ZHOIDre states had 
UHLI\LQJHIIHFWVDVWKH\µµWUHDWHG>SHRSOH@DVREMHFWV¶¶S,QWKHQHR-liberal era, 
governments have instituted markets within public services with the stated intention of 
making them more responsive to users. According to Scott Veitch et al (2012), the 
marketization of public services, together with the re-embedding of private law 
mechanisms (particularly contract and property law) within them, signifies a fifth epoch 
of juridification (p. 262). 
 
The five dimensions of juridification delineated by Lars Blichner and Anders Molander 
(2008: 38) are used, in this article, to examine recent NHS reforms. The first dimension 
is constitutive juridification, whereby the legal system accrues competences by 
establishing or altering the constitutive norms of a political order (p. 38). The second 
dimension refers to a process through which law comes to regulate an increasing 
number of different activities (pp. 38-39). This article describes how laws, such as 
contract law and EU public procurement and competition laws, have increasingly come 
to regulate the NHS. The third dimension refers to a process through which conflicts 
are increasingly solved by, or with, reference to law (p. 39). This article demonstrates 
that conflicts regarding NHS procurement are increasingly being resolved with 
reference to, or by, law. The fourth dimension refers to a process through which the 
legal system and profession acquire more power as contrasted with formal authority 
(p. 39). The increase in litigation noted in this article suggests that the legal system 
has acquired more power over the NHS. The fifth dimension is legal framing, a process 
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by which people increasingly perceive themselves, and others, as legal subjects (p. 
39). In this regard, new legal statuses have affected the behaviour of NHS entities.   
 
New Constitutionalism 
 
Juridification may be driven by external constitutional constraints. Stephen Gill (1995) 
KDVLGHQWLILHGWKHSROLWLFDOSURMHFWRIQHZFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPZKLFKDWWHPSWVµµWRPDNH
transnational liberalism, and if possible liberal democratic capitalism, the sole model 
IRUIXWXUHGHYHORSPHQW¶¶S*LOOVWDWHVWKDWWKLVPD\LQYROYHDOWHUDWLRQVWR
WKHµµVXSUHPHODZVDQGJRYHUQLQJIUDPHZRUNVRIQDWLRQV¶¶DQGWKHH[WHQVLRQRIµSUH-
commitmenW¶ PHFKDQLVPV µµGHVLJQHG WR µORFN LQ¶ FRPPLWPHQWV WR GLVFLSOLQDU\ QHR-
OLEHUDOLVP¶¶DQGSUHYHQWDOWHUQDWLYHVVXFKDVVRFLDOLVPE\PDNLQJLWVPHDQVVXFKDV
nationalisation, illegal (p. 79). This logic is evident in the EU, which the UK joined in 
1973. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn (2013: 189) states that the EU subordinates the 
democratic governance of member states to the dictates of the single market. EU law 
affects the English NHS in numerous ways. Both John Harrington (2007) and Kenneth 
Veitch (2012) have analysed juridification in respect of patient mobility case law. This 
article concentrates on EU public procurement and competition law. The former is 
designed to prevent discrimination on the grounds of nationality (Collins 2015: 2). The 
latter is designed to ensure that competition, where it exists, benefits consumers (Ibid). 
Scott Greer (2008: 224) states that such laws apply to the healthcare systems of EU 
member states due to decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 
EU member states are able to deliver public services through the public sector but, as 
Ben Collins (2015: 3) notes, EU public procurement law and competition law become 
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applicable when markets are used. It has been argued, for example by Kyriaki-Korina 
Raptopoulou (2015a: 116) and Tamara Hervey and Jean McHale (2015: 545), that 
once an EU member state privatises health services, it cannot return them to public 
ownership. Consequently, once EU laws are engaged following privatisation, they may 
lock out alternatives to the market. The impact of successive reforms on the 
applicability of EU laws to the NHS is considered below.  
 
NHS 
 
The UK NHS was established, in the era of the social democratic consensus, via the 
National Health Service Act (1946), and became operational in  7KH 1+6¶
founding principles were that it was to be free (at the point of access), comprehensive, 
universal and funded from general taxation. Rahel Jaeggi (2001) argues that 
healthcare systems, such as the NHS, institutionalised solidarity, which involves 
µµVWDQGLQJXSIRUHDFKRWKHUEHFDXVHRQHUHFRJQLVHVRQH¶VRZQIDWHLQWKHIDWHRIWKH
RWKHU¶¶ S  $FFRUGLQJ WR -RKQ 7RUUDQFH  UHLILFDWLRQ RI ZKLFK
depoliticization is a mode) may undermine solidarity (p. 105) and generate 
estrangement (p. xiii). Historically, the internal regulation of the NHS was commonly 
DFKLHYHG WKURXJK FLUFXODUV RIWHQ LVVXHGDV SHU WKH 6HFUHWDU\ RI6WDWH IRU+HDOWK¶V
power to give directions (National Health Service (NHS) Act (1977), S.17) and various 
other Department of Health policy statements (Newdick 2005: 75). In the current neo-
liberal era, politicians have regarded markets as the answer to the reifying effects of 
welfare states identified by Habermas. As successive governments in the neo-liberal 
era have viewed full marketization of healthcare as being electorally unviable, they 
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have instituted quasi-markets within the NHS. This article focuses on secondary care, 
although primary care has not been immune from reform. The three episodes of 
market reform examined within this article are the internal market introduced by the 
Conservatives in the 1990s, the mimic-PDUNHW FUHDWHG E\ /DERXU¶V UHIRUPV LQ WKH
2000s and the current market instituted by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
FRDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQW¶V+HDOWKDQG6Rcial Care (HSC) Act (2012).  
 
 The Internal Market 
 
The Conservative party was in government for eighteen years between 1979 and 
1997. It introduced an internal market into the NHS, via the National Health Service 
and Community Care (NHSCC) Act (1990). This split purchasers (District Health 
Authorities and some fundholding GPs) and providers. The reforms ended the 
advantages of cost-sharing and integrated care (Pollock et al 2005: 47) thereby 
increasing bureaucracy and overhead costs (Lister 2007: xi). Providers could apply to 
become trusts (which differ from other trusts in English law). The new legal status of 
trust meant that management and financial functions became dominant in hospitals 
(Jenkins 1995: 78). The NHSCC Act (1990), S.4(3), provided that agreements 
between health service bodies did not give rise to contractual rights or responsibilities. 
It was intended that disputes would be resolved by internal regimes of conciliation and 
arbitration (Hughes et al 1997: 73). In practice, parties to disputes were encouraged 
to resolve them between themselves or through informal conciliation (Hughes et al 
1997: 73-74). Thus although the NHS had been marketized, disputes were still 
resolved internally rather than with reference to legal rules.  
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EU competition law may have become applicable following the introduction of the 
internal market (Lear et al 2010: 345). However, this is uncertain as it was never 
assessed by the courts (Lear et al 2010: 345). Another transnational legal regime with 
the ability to constrain NHS policymaking is the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), overseen by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). GATS entered 
into force in 1995 and brought services under the domain of multilateral trade rules for 
the first time (Sinclair 2015: 112). The UK government (unlike many other 
governments) agreed to liberalise hospital services (Pollock and Price 2002). As the 
role of non-NHS providers increases, it becomes more likely that parts of the NHS may 
fall under GATS rules (Vincent-Jones 2006: 64) which may entrench privatisation 
(Sexton 2003: 100). Although the potential constraining effect of GATS on NHS 
policymaking was noted by many academics, it did not inform public debate. The 
following keyword searches were conducted on tKH+LVWRULF+DQVDUGZHEVLWH µ1+6
:72¶µ1+6*$76¶µ1+6:RUOG7UDGH2UJDQLVDWLRQ¶DQGµ1+6*HQHUDO$JUHHPHQW
RQ7UDGHLQ6HUYLFHV¶7KHUHZHUHQRUHVXOWVIRUWKHILUVWWZRVHDUFKWHUPVZLWKLQWKH
1990s. There were sixty-one results and six results for the latter two search terms 
respectively, but none of the generated results concerned parliamentary discussion 
regarding the potentially constraining effect of GATS on NHS policymaking within the 
1990s. The same keyword searches were conducted on Proquest. There were no 
results for the second search term, although the first, third and fourth search terms 
generated fourteen, 267 and sixty-five results respectively. Of such results, only one 
article, by Will Hutton (1999), concerned the potential applicability of GATS to the 
NHS.  
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Although the internal market was criticised by the Labour party and was opposed by 
the British Medical Association (BMA), many citizens were unaware of the reforms. 
)RUH[DPSOHDERXWKDOIRI WKHSDUWLFLSDQWV LQ0DULDQQD)RWDNL¶V : 1423) case 
study of cataract surgery in Outer London were unaware of the reforms. Thus the 
market reforms of the 1990s were not highly politicised and the potential external 
constitutional restrictions on NHS policymaking seem not to have generated much 
comment (outside of academia) in that decade. This may be because the internal 
market was less controversial than subsequent reforms, as it did not furnish private 
companies with new opportunities (as it involved competition between NHS providers), 
and disputes were resolved internally (hence the courts were unable to adjudicate on 
the applicability of transnational laws).  
 
/DERXU¶V0LPLF-Market 
 
Despite having opposed the internal market, once elected in 1997 (the first of three 
electoral victories) Labour retained the split between purchasers and providers, which 
ZDVµµUHQDPHGFRPPLVVLRQLQJ¶¶7LPPLQV,QFRQWUDVWWKHVSOLWZDVUHPRYHG
in Scotland and Wales by newly devolved governments, which were enabled to 
determine health policy for their respective countries. In England, Primary Care 
Groups (PCGs), which evolved into Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) (Paton 2002: 128), 
were given responsibility for commissioning. Following its re-election in 2001, Labour 
gradually started introducing market-like mechanisms into the NHS (Mays et al 2011: 
6). This involved demand side reforms, supply side reforms, transactional reforms and 
system management reforms (Department of Health 2007a: 3). The supply side 
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reforms included increasing provider diversity. For example, New Labour created 
foundation trusts (FTs) (via the Health and Social Care (Community Health and 
Standards) (HSC) Act (2003)) which were afforded greater freedoms than NHS trusts. 
Such freedoms included independence from the Department of Health (rather they are 
regulated by Monitor) and powers to borrow and invest money. Pauline $OOHQHWDO¶V
 FDVH VWXG\ LQGLFDWHG WKDW WUXVWV EHFDPH µµPRUH EXVLQHVV IRFXVHG¶¶ RQFH
elevated to FT status (p. 3). New Labour also enabled private companies to 
increasingly deliver NHS services by creating independent sector treatment centres 
(ISTCs), which provided NHS elective and diagnostic procedures. NHS patients were 
also enabled, in some circumstances, to choose private providers. Consequently, an 
increasing proportion of the NHS budget was channelled to private providers. The 
transactional reforms included introducing payment by results (PBR) for reimbursing 
secondary care providers for many treatments. As already alluded to, the demand side 
reforms included furnishing patients with more choice (ultimately of any willing provider 
for some treatments) and developments in commissioning, such as commissioners 
being encouraged to use external support from private companies.  
 
The activities of commissioners became increasingly regulated by law. Labour 
encouraged commissioners to utilise external commissioning support from private 
companies. Commissioners that did so were required to comply with EU public 
procurement law. The Public Contract Regulations (PCR) (2006) implemented a 2004 
EU public procurement directive into UK law. The directive distinguished between part 
A services (including management and procurement consultancy services) and part B 
services (including health and social care services). The former were subject to the 
provisions of the directive. In contrast, contracts relating to the latter were only subject 
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to Article 23 (concerning technical specifications) and Article 35(4) (concerning 
notices) of the directive (as per Article 21). Thus commissioners using competition in 
procuring health and social care services were not required to comply with all of the 
provisions of the directive. Nonetheless, they were still required to adhere to the 
principles of the EU treaties.  
 
Although Labour encouraged both external commissioning support and provider 
diversity, commissioners could avoid the public procurement rules if they provided 
services in-house, or, as per the Teckal case, they exercised control over the provider 
(which undertook the essential part of its activities with the commissioner) similar to 
their control over their own internal departments (Collins 2015: 5/ Hancher and Sauter 
2012: 147-148). Consequently, NHS contracts between PCTs and NHS Trusts were 
exempt, but contracts between PCTs and FTs were not (Brown 2013). Nonetheless, 
/DERXU¶VFKDPSLRQLQJRIGLYHUVLW\RISURYLVLRQPHDQWWKDWFDUHLQFUHDVLQJO\EHJDQWR
be bought through legally binding contracts. Consequently, EU public procurement 
law became more applicable (Timmins 2008). Scott Greer and Simone Rauscher 
(2011: 812) state that Labour deliberately opted to force EU public procurement law 
into health services as it was a logical consequence of, and a way to lock in, a market 
IRU FOLQLFDO VHUYLFHV 7KH µPrinciples and Rules for Co-operation DQG &RPSHWLWLRQ¶
µPRCC¶SXEOLVKHGE\WKH'HSDUWPHQWRI+HDOWKLQEFRQWDLQHG(8OHJDO
positions (Owen 2015). Conflicts were increasingly resolved with reference to the 
µPRCC¶DGMXGLFDWHGRQE\WKH&R-operation and Competition Panel (CCP) established 
in 2009. 
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7KHLQFUHDVHGFRPSHWLWLRQZLWKLQWKH1+6RFFDVLRQHGE\/DERXU¶VUHIRUPVPHDQW
that EU competition law was also engaged. EU competition law applies if a service is 
economic and a service provider is an undertaking (Greer et al 2014: 101). Okeoghene 
Odudu (2011: 233) states that activities are considered economic firstly, if an entity 
supplies goods or services to the market. Secondly, as per the Bettercare Group 
Limited case, absent legislative intervention, there must be the potential to make a 
profit (p. 233). Odudu states that this is a technical question concerning whether a 
service could merely be provided to fee-payers (p. 236). The EU treaties do not define 
what constitutes an undertaking (p. 232). Odudu states that an entity may be deemed 
to be an undertaking in relation to some activities, but not others, even if it is not for 
profit (p. 232). Odudu concluded that although NHS hospitals in England are state 
owned and funded and operate to provide universal coverage, free at the point of 
GHOLYHU\ WKH\ µµIDOOZLWKLQ WKHVFRSHRI(8FRPSHWLWLRQ ODZ¶¶ S +RZHYHU(8
competition law may not have applied to the entire English NHS. As Simon Taylor 
(2015: 6) argues, it could be credibly argued that NHS providers are only economic 
operators concerning activities which have been exposed to competition, such as 
diagnostic and elective secondary care services. 
 
As with public procurement law, there are exemptions to competition law. For example, 
it may not apply if a service is designated as a service of general economic interest 
(SGEI) (as per TFEU, Article 106(2)), a service of general interest (SGI) (which is not 
part of any binding legal text), a social service of general interest (SSGI) or a non-
economic service of general interest (NESGI) (as per the Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol 
26) (Neergaard 2013: 207-210). However, such concepts are not integrated into the 
law, or vocabularies, of member states (Bauby 2013: 36), hence their applicability is 
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ambiguous. Ulla Neergaard (2011: 48-49) notes that the concept of solidarity (internal 
to member states) has also become increasingly significant in EU law, but that the 
degree of immunity it affords is unclear. Consequently, although scope existed for 
exceptions, in increasing competition withiQWKH1+6/DERXU¶VUHIRUPVPHDQWWKDW(8
competition law became increasingly applicable.  
 
As its reforms afforded increasing opportunities for private companies within the NHS, 
Labour faced increasing criticism from its own backbenchers, trade unions and 
academics who were concerned about the impact on the NHS. In addition, Sally 
5XDQH  QRWHV WKDW µµRQH RI WKH FRQVHTXHQFHV RI PDUNHWL]DWLRQ DQG JURZLQJ
privatisation was the emergence of groups of citizens organising to resist further 
GHYHORSPHQWV¶¶p. 280). For example, Keep Our NHS Public (KONP) was formed in 
2005 and organised national protests and local campaigns. While privatisation 
became increasingly contested, the potential for EU law to render it irreversible does 
not appear to have attracted much attention outside of academia. Keyword searches 
RIµ1+6(8SXEOLFSURFXUHPHQW¶DQGµ1+6(8FRPSHWLWLRQODZ¶ZHUHFRQGXFWHGRQWKH
Historic Hansard website. The search terms generated three and four results, within 
the 2000s, respectively. None of the results showed parliamentary acknowledgement 
of the potential constraining effect of EU law on NHS policymaking. Nonetheless, 
some politicians were aware of this potential constraint. For example, Frank Dobson 
(Secretary of State for Health between 1997 and 1999) advised Tony Blair (UK Prime 
Minister between 1997 and 2007) to seek an exemption for the NHS within the Lisbon 
Treaty (Dobson 2013: 41). This did not materialise. The same searches were 
conducted on Proquest and generated 159 and 204 results respectively. Although 
many of the generated results were not relevant, such searches indicate that some 
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MRXUQDOLVWVVXFKDV1LFKRODV7LPPLQVUHFRJQLVHGVXFKFRQVWUDLQWV/DERXU¶VUHIRUPV
thus meant that the NHS became increasingly subject to contract law and EU public 
procurement and competition law. Although the privatisation that such reforms 
facilitated was contested, there is an apparent lack of awareness among politicians, 
and many journalists, of the potential for EU law to restrict NHS policymaking. This 
may be because of the aforementioned exceptions and because private companies 
tended to refer contested issues to CCP rather than the courts. 
 
The Health and Social Care Act (2012) 
 
The HSC Act (2012) instituted the current market in the English NHS. The amount of 
the NHS budget going to private providers has increased. It was recently calculated 
as totalling £12.7 billion (Lafond et al 2017: 3). Additionally, the NHS is not currently 
being adequately funded. Between 2009/10 and 2014/15, increases in public spending 
on health averaged 1.1% a year, the lowest five-year growth rate since the 1950s 
(Luchinskaya et al 2017: 141). This contrasts with the spending increases above 
inflation of three to four percent per annum that the NHS requires to maintain 
performance and grow services (Davis et al 2015: 12). Such inadequate funding has 
meant that NHS performance has deteriorated leading to increasing private activity 
outside of the NHS. As a result, the profits of some private providers have doubled 
(Price 2016). The use of market mechanisms, requiring expensive tendering 
processes and potential legal challenges, also represents a large opportunity cost for 
the NHS. Calum Paton (2016: 165) estimates that the recurring annual costs of the 
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current market are approximately £4 billion. This amount would be better spent on 
patient care. 
 
The HSC Act (2012) abolished Strategic Health Authorities and PCTs. It created NHS 
England, to commission primary care and specialist services, and Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs), to commission secondary care services. Monitor 
(now known as NHS Improvement following its merger with the NHS Trust 
Development Authority in 2016) was empowered as a sector regulator to prevent anti-
FRPSHWLWLYHEHKDYLRXU,W¶V&R-operation and CompetLWLRQ'LUHFWRUDWHWRRNRYHU&&3¶V
role in 2013. Commissioners are required to comply with the regulations passed 
pursuant to the HSC Act (2012), S.75, and PCR (2006), for procurements before the 
18th of April 2016, or the Public Contract Regulations (PCR) (2015), for procurements 
after that date. PCR (2015) implemented the 2014 EU directive on public procurement 
into UK law. This removed the aforementioned distinction between part A and part B 
services. Consequently, commissioners must advertise all invitations to tender for 
health service contracts above specified thresholds in the Official Journal of the EU 
(OJEU) and follow a specified procurement process (Collins 2015: 3). Nonetheless, 
as with PCR (2006), there are exemptions to PCR (2015), such as the sole supplier 
exemption. The government has not issued guidance on how the S.75 regulations and 
PCR (2015) interrelate (Procurement Lawyers Association (PLA) 2016: 13). PLA 
(2016: 25) surmise that inconsistencies are likely to be resolved in favour of EU law 
because of its supremacy.  
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Anne Davies (2013) argues that the HSC Act (2012) exemplifies the second (law 
regulating an increasing number of activities) and fourth (the legal system acquiring 
more power) dimensions of juridification, identified by Blichner and Molander, as it 
µµLQYROYHV PXFK JUHDWHU XVH RI ODZ WR VWUXFWXUH DQG UHJXODWH WKH 1+6 LQ SODFH RI
WUDGLWLRQDO PHFKDQLVPV OLNH PLQLVWHULDO GLUHFWLRQ¶¶ S  'DYLHV DYHUV WKDW WKH
reforms are also indicative of another sense of juridification, identified by Veitch et al, 
in which decisions that were previously a matter for government policy become shaped 
and governed by legal rules (p. 567). For example, Davies notes that the use of private 
firms within the NHS has become a technical legal matter (p. 567). Davies examined 
WKUHH DUHDV RI MXULGLILFDWLRQ µµPHUJHUV EHWZHHQ SURYLGHUV RWKHU FRPSHWLWLRQ ODZ
requirements for providers [abuse of a dominant position and agreements to restrict 
FRPSHWLWLRQ@DQGWKHUXOHVDSSOLFDEOHWRFRPPLVVLRQHUV¶¶S). These areas are 
examined in the following paragraphs. 
 
Davies (2013) states that, before the HSC Act (2012), mergers, abuse of a dominant 
SRVLWLRQDQGDJUHHPHQWV WRUHVWULFWFRPSHWLWLRQZHUHGHDOWZLWKYLD WKH µPRCC¶ SS
581-582). Davies states that the HSC Act (2012) altered the situation, regarding abuse 
of a dominant position and agreements to restrict competition, by: implicitly accepting 
that competition law applied to at least some aspects of NHS activity; empowering 
Monitor as the sector regulator; and, requiring licence-holders to refrain from anti-
competitive behaviour (p. 582). As such law already applied (although scope existed 
for exceptions), the altered situation was government acknowledgement of its 
applicability rather than a legal change. Davies states that CCP had determined 
whether to approve proposed mergers through a cost-benefit analysis (p. 581). The 
HSC Act (2012) subjects mergers involving FTs to the Enterprise Act (2002), enforced 
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by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) (created following the merger of the 
Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission in 2014). Davies stated that 
the change meant that there could be serious consequences if a merger breached the 
rules (p. 581). This was evidenced by a proposed merger, between Royal 
Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospitals and Poole Hospital Trusts, failing, in 2013, 
as it was deemed that it would reduce competition in Dorset. The Guardian columnist 
Polly Toynbee (2013) noted that the applicability of EU competition law deterred other 
potential mergers which may have benefited patients. Nonetheless, Marie Sanderson 
et al (2016: 16) state that following the decision, the NHS has avoided entanglement 
with competition law. Instead sector regulators have relied on sectoral rules 
(Sanderson et al 2016: 16/ Calkin 2014).  
 
Davies (2013: 583) notes that competition and public procurement law are mutually 
exclusive hence a body cannot be subject to both. However, Davies states that this 
GLVWLQFWLRQ ZDV EOXUUHG E\ ERWK WKH µPRCC¶ DQG WKH +6& $FW  S  )RU
example, R.10 of the S.75 regulations forbids commissioners from engaging in anti-
competitive behaviour. The PLA (2016: 73-74) argue that NHS commissioners may 
be deemed to be undertakings in certain circumstances, for example, if they sell on 
their purchased services (although they conclude that this is unlikely). PLA (2016: 13) 
contend that the S.75 regulations arguably conflict with each other. Consequently, the 
amount of discretion afforded to commissioners regarding tendering is contested. 
David Lock QC (2013) argues that the narrow test in R.5 of the S.75 regulations (which 
states that commissioners may award new contracts to a single provider where they 
are satisfied that only that provider is capable of providing the contracted services) 
emasculates R.2 (which states that commissioners must act to secure service-XVHU¶V
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needs and improve service quality and efficiency) and R.10 (which permits 
commissioners to engage in anti-competitive behaviour if it is in patienW¶VLQWHUHVWVIRU
services to be provided in an integrated way or for co-operation between providers to 
improve quality). Lock (2013) states that if a contract can be provided by more than 
one provider, commissioners must hold a competitive tender, even if it is not in 
SDWLHQW¶VLQWHUHVWV+RZHYHU3/$VWDWHWKDW0RQLWRU¶VJXLGDQFHVXJJHVWV
that the starting point for commissioners, in determining whether to use competition, 
is R.2 and R.3 (which states that commissioners must procure services from one or 
more providers that are most capable of delivering the objectives outlined in R.2 and 
provide the best value for money in doing so) rather than R.5.  
 
Although the discretion afforded to commissioners, regarding the use of competition, 
is contested, many commissioners have acted as though such discretion was 
curtailed. A Health Services Journal (HSJ) poll found that forty-six percent of 
respondents (103 respondents across ninety-three CCGs) stated that CCGs had not 
been able to change services as desired due to the regulations, or concerns about 
them, and twenty-nine percent stated that they had invited competition for services 
where they would not have done if not for the rules (West 2014). Thus commissioners 
may opt to conduct expensive tendering processes due to fear of potential legal 
challenges. A fifth of respondents to HSJ¶VSROOVWDWHGWKDWWKHLU&&*¶VGHFLVLRQVKDG
been legally challenged (West 2014). Providers dissatisfied with tendering processes 
may complain to NHS Improvement, the European Commission (which can refer 
issues to CJEU) or the courts via judicial review (if public law principles are 
contravened) (PLA 2016: 50-57). Sanderson et al (2016) argued that the small number 
of cases suggests a long-standing practice to settle matters informally, even avoiding 
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1+6 ,PSURYHPHQW¶V VHFWRU VSHFLILF UHJXODWLRQ +RZHYHU DV WKH 1+6 6XSSRUW
Federation (NSF) (2017: 38) note, some providers, such as Virgin, have become 
increasingly litigious. For example, in 2017 Virgin was paid an undisclosed fee to settle 
a legal case regarding its challenge to the decision of CCGs in Surrey not to award it 
a conWUDFWWRSURYLGHFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDOWKVHUYLFHV16),WZDVVSHFXODWHGWKDW
the fee was approximately £2 million (Embury-Dennis 2017). This payment generated 
controversy and thousands have signed a petition demanding that Virgin return the 
money to the NHS (Embury-Dennis 2017). Thus conflicts are increasingly being solved 
with reference to law (for example, by CCP or NHS Improvement) and by law itself 
(within the courts) and the legal system is acquiring more authority through litigation. 
 
There are countervailing forces to competition, such as resource constraints, which 
prevent commissioners from undertaking numerous tenders (Osipovic et al 2016: 
834), and the squeeze on prices due to austerity and limited budgets (Krachler and 
Greer 2015: 216-217). ,Q DGGLWLRQ FDPSDLJQHUV KDYH LQIOXHQFHG FRPPLVVLRQHU¶V
GHFLVLRQV)RUH[DPSOHFDPSDLJQHUVSUHYHQWHG9LUJLQWDNLQJRYHUFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDOWK
services in Bristol (Molloy 2016). Nick Krachler and Ian Greer (2015) state that the 
vigorous defence of the NHS by FDPSDLJQHUVVXFKDV.213KDVµµNHSWKHDOWKFDUH
SROLF\KLJKO\SROLWLFLVHG¶¶S$OWKRXJKSULYDWL]DWLRQKDVEHFRPHDWHFKQLFDOOHJDO
matter, the proliferation of local KONP groups, which have more than doubled since 
2010, suggests that there is increased awareness of, and resistance to, it. KONP 
collaborated with other groups to create Health Campaigns Together (HCT), which 
organised the largest rally in NHS history, against cuts and privatisation, in London, in 
March 2017. This indicates that public solidarity, which was important in the creation 
of the NHS, endures in respect of healthcare.  
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In addition, there has been an increased focus on integration, rather than competition, 
ZKLFKLVHYLGHQWLQ1+6(QJODQG¶VµFive Year Forward View¶µFYFV¶&RPmissioners 
LQ$OOHQHWDO¶VFDVHVWXG\EHOLHYHGWKDWµFYFV¶DIIRUGHGWKHPJUHDWHUODWLWXGH
LQGHFLGLQJZKHWKHUWRWHQGHUVHUYLFHV µFYFV¶RXWOLQHGDQXPEHURIQHZPRGHOVRI
integrating care. Numerous vanguards have been established in this regard. In order 
WR LPSOHPHQW µFYFV¶(QJODQGZDVGLYLGHG ZLWKRXW OHJLVODWLRQ LQWR IRUW\-four areas 
and Sustainability and Transformation Plans (STPs) were composed for each one. 
STPs have proposed reconfigurations to services, in an effort to resolve the problems 
caused by inadequate funding (Leys 2016: 7). For example, in Dorset, proposals to 
reconfigure Poole hospital, including closing its accident and emergency (Our Dorset 
2016: 31) were recently approved by Dorset CCG, but are opposed by the pressure 
group, Defend Dorset NHS, which has launched a judicial review (BBC 2018). STPs 
are viewed as a shift from competition to place-based planning (Alderwick et al 2016: 
7). Simon Stevens (NHS England Chief Executive since 2014) states that some STPs 
may develop into accountable care organisations (ACOs) which can move beyond the 
purchaser/provider split (Committee of Public Accounts 2017: Q90).  
 
Kailash Chand (2017) argues that developments, such as devolution of health service 
functions to some areas, such as Manchester, Liverpool and London (facilitated by the 
Cities and Local Government Devolution Act (2016), S.18), and the development of 
ACOs, signal the demise of CCGs. Without legal changes, integration may be 
challenged. Nevertheless, NSF (2017: 35) note that NHS organisations are finding 
ways of avoiding tendering. For example, health leaders in Manchester game-played 
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the rules in advertising a £6 billion contract to run a local care organisation (part of a 
new integrated care model) in the city by not dividing the large contract into lots (as is 
common practice) and through the very short time frame (six weeks) for bids (NSF 
2017: 35/ Sanchez-Graells 2017). The Department of Health (2017) has conducted a 
technical consultation on proposed regulatory changes to facilitate ACO contracts. As 
there has not been a public consultation, or parliamentary scrutiny, a group of 
academics, including Allyson Pollock and the late Stephen Hawking, have challenged 
such proposed changes through a judicial review. There are fears that ACOs will 
provide private companies with new opportunities within the NHS. Despite the 
seeming shift away from competition, NSF (2017: 3) note that market activity for NHS 
contracts continues apace, as £7.1 billion worth of NHS clinical contracts were 
awarded through tendering between April 2016 and April 2017.  
 
The potentially constraining effect of EU law on the NHS became a contested issue 
GXULQJWKHFRDOLWLRQ¶VSHULRGLQJRYHUQPHQW)RUH[DPSOH(G0LOLEDQG/DERXUSDUW\
leader from 2010 to 2015) asked David Cameron (UK Prime Minister between 2010 
and 2016) at a session of Prime Ministers Questions to confirm whether the bill which 
EHFDPHWKH+6&$FWZRXOGPDNHµµKHDOWKFDUHVXEMHFWWR(8FRPSHWLWLRQODZ
IRUWKHILUVWWLPHLQKLVWRU\"¶¶(H.C. Deb. 16 March 2011). As outlined above, such law 
DOUHDG\SDUWO\DSSOLHGWRWKH1+6SULRUWRWKH+6&$FW0LOLEDQG¶VEHOLHIWKDW
the legislation would initiate the applicability of EU competition law demonstrates a 
lack of awareness of the impaFW RI /DERXU¶V UHIRUPV 1RQHWKHOHVV VRPH
parliamentarians, such as Lord Clement Jones, were aware that EU competition law 
KDG DSSOLHG WR WKH 1+6 µµIRU VRPH \HDUV¶¶ +HDOWK DQG 6RFLDO &DUH %LOO 'HE 
December 2011).  
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+DQVDUGVHDUFKHVRI µ1+6(8SXEOLFSURFXUHPHQW¶DQG µ1+6(8FRPSHWLWLRQ ODZ¶
from 2010 onwards, generated forty-three and seventy-seven spoken references 
respectively. The same searches were conducted on Proquest and generated 285 and 
691 results, from 2010 onwards, respectively. Such search results suggest increased 
parliamentary and journalistic awareness of the applicability of EU law to the NHS. 
Andrew Lansley (Secretary of State for Health between 2010 and 2012) argued that 
the HSC Bill was not extending either EU or domestic competition law (Health 
&RPPLWWHH  (Y +H VWDWHG WKDW µµOLWHUDOO\ RXU OHJLVODWLRQ FDQQRW DIIHFW WKH
H[WHQWRI(8FRPSHWLWLRQ ODZ¶¶ +HDOWK&RPPLWWHH(Y ,QFRQWUDVW6LPRQ
Burns (Minister of State for Health Services between 2010 and 2012) stated WKDWµµDV
NHS providers develop and begin to compete actively with other NHS providers and 
with private and voluntary providers, UK and EU competition laws will increasingly 
EHFRPHDSSOLFDEOH¶¶+HDOWKDQG6RFLDO&DUH%LOO'HE0DUFK7KXV/DQVOH\¶V
claim that UK legislation could not affect the extent of EU competition law was 
misleading, as the UK government could enact legislation that would increase 
competition within the NHS, and this would, in turn, extend the application of EU 
competition law to the NHS.  
 
7KH FRDOLWLRQ¶V +6& $FW  KDV OHG WR LQFUHDVHG SULYDWH SURYLVLRQ DQG WKH
increased applicability of EU laws. The strategy of juridification appears to have failed 
to depoliticise such changes, which have been contested. Similarly, the strategy of 
new constitutionalism appears to have failed as the exact nature of the applicability of 
EU public procurement and competition laws became politically contested during the 
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FRDOLWLRQ¶VSHULRGLQJRYHUQPHQW,Q$QG\%XUQKDP6KDGRZ6HFUHWDry of State 
for Health between 2011 and 2015) stated that Labour would fully exempt the NHS 
from EU public procurement and competition law (Collins 2015: 1). According to 
Burnham, the European Commission had confirmed that this was possible (Campbell 
2015). However, as mentioned above, EU law may constrain the policymaking abilities 
of national governments regarding services which are already subject to competition. 
 
The Brexit Referendum and Afterwards 
 
The Conservatives won a majority in the House of Commons in the 2015 general 
election and thus were able to govern without the Liberal Democrats. In June 2016, 
the UK electorate voted to leave the EU, in a referendum. Cameron resigned as Prime 
Minister and was succeeded by Theresa May. The Conservatives lost their majority in 
WKHJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQEXWFRQWLQXHWRJRYHUQZLWKWKHVXSSRUWRI1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG¶V
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). During the referendum campaign, the potential of 
EU laws to constrain NHS policymaking was raised by some pro-Brexit organisations 
and campaigners, such as Labour Leave (a pro-Brexit campaign group within the 
Labour party) and David Owen (2016: 139), former leader of the Social Democratic 
Party between 1983 and 1987 (before its merger with the Liberal party to create the 
Liberal Democrats) and a member of the Campaign Committee (the governing body) 
of Vote Leave (which the Electoral Commission designated as the official campaign in 
favour of leaving the EU). Searches of newspapers and other sources indicate that 
there were concerns prior to, and during the referendum campaign, that a potential 
trade deal between the US and the EU, known as the trans-Atlantic trade and 
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investment partnership (TTIP), could restrict policymaking concerning the NHS. The 
8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VGHFLVion to expose public ambulance services and all secondary 
care services to the liberalising effect of a trade agreement between Canada and the 
EU, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), was viewed as a 
worrying precedent for TTIP (Raptopoulou 2015b: 2).  
 
$ 3URTXHVW VHDUFK RI µ1+6 77,3¶ IURP  ZKHQ WKH 77,3 QHJRWLDWLRQV EHJDQ
onwards, generated 1,038 results. The potential impact of TTIP was raised in 
numerous articles within the Guardian (Quinn 2016/ Mason 2016) and the 
Independent (Williams 2015/ Sheffield 2016). The same search was conducted on 
Hansard and generated 147 spoken references.  For example, the impact of the 
prospective deal on the NHS was considered within a House of Commons debate 
dedicated to TTIP on the 10th of December 2015 (H.C. Deb. 10 December 2015). TTIP 
also provoked reactions from trade unions, such as Unite the Union, which sought and 
published legal advice from Raptopoulou (2015b) and Michael Bowsher QC and 
Azeem Suterwalla (2016), regarding the legal implications for the NHS. 38 Degrees (a 
not for profit political activism organisation) organised a petition to prevent TTIP (which 
received thousands of signatures), orchestrated the sending of emails to politicians 
and disseminated its message via advertisements and leaflets (Whalley 2016).  
 
Owen Worth (2017: 351-354) argues that although many left-wing Brexit supporters 
KRSHGLWZRXOGIUHHWKH8.IURPWKH(8¶VQHR-liberal structures, it has succoured the 
far-right, conservatives and hyper-liberals and may diminish the prospects for socialist 
UHQHZDO:RUWK¶VSHVVLPLVWLFDQDO\VLVZDVSDUWO\LQIOXHQFHGE\/DERXU¶VSRRURSLQLRQ
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SROO UDWLQJV LQ HDUO\  S  ZKLFK ZHUH VXEVHTXHQWO\ EHOLHG E\ /DERXU¶V
performance in the 2017 general election. As the above analysis demonstrates, legal 
constraints on NHS policymaking result from political choices. Some of the potentially 
available political choices pertaining to Brexit may threaten national policymaking 
concerning the NHS.  As both May and Jeremy Corbyn (Labour Leader since 2015) 
favour leaving the EU single market, the constraints of EU laws on NHS policymaking 
may cease to apply after Brexit, depending on the terms of any future trading 
agreement between the UK and the EU (McKenna 2016).  
 
Given the current goveUQPHQW¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR IUHH WUDGH0DUN'D\DQ 
argues that Brexit may simply mean replacing the backstops of EU single market law 
with new ones. If the UK leaves the customs union (as May wishes, but Corbyn now 
opposes), it could enter into trade DJUHHPHQWV WKDW UHVWULFW SDUOLDPHQW¶V DELOLW\ WR
legislate regarding the NHS. Concern about this has been expressed by journalists, 
such as George Monbiot (2016), trade union leaders, such as Dave Prentis (General 
Secretary of UNISON since 2001), politicians, such as Jonathan Ashworth (Shadow 
Secretary of State for Health from 2016 onwards) (Edwards 2017) and numerous 
doctors, many of whom signed a letter, printed in the Guardian, demanding protection 
IRUWKH1+6µµIURPD>'RQDOG@7UXPS>863UHVLGHQWIURP2017 onwards]-style corporate 
WDNHRYHU¶¶0DFNOLQ-Doherty et al 2017). In addition, thousands of people have signed 
an open letter to Liam Fox (Secretary of State for International Trade from 2016 
onwards), written by 38 Degrees, which states that any new trade deals must protect 
the NHS (38 Degrees 2017).   
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Discussion 
 
The English NHS has been increasingly juridified, in the neo-liberal era, as laws (such 
as contract law and EU public procurement and competition laws) have come to 
increasingly regulate the activities of NHS actors (and new legal statuses have altered 
the behaviour of such actors). In addition, conflicts within the NHS have been 
increasingly solved with reference to (for example, by CCP and NHS Improvement), 
and by (as private providers have become more litigious), law, hence the legal system 
has accrued more power as contrasted with formal authority. Although privatisation 
has become a technical legal matter, the NHS seems increasingly politicised, as is 
evident in the activities of groups such as KONP and HCT. Recent surveys reveal a 
decline in respondents agreeing with the notion that the provider of health services is 
immaterial, as long as they are free (Ipsos MORI 2013/ Appleby et al 2015: 115). This 
may indicate increased public awareness of the detrimental effect of the expanding 
private sector on the NHS. It could translate into increased clamour for neo-liberal 
reforms to be reversed, as the NHS (Reinstatement) Bill proposes, given continued 
SXEOLFVXSSRUWIRUWKH1+6¶IRXQGLQJSULnciples (Gershlick et al 2015: 11). 
 
The evident concerns regarding the potential of TTIP and post-Brexit trade deals to 
constrain NHS policymaking suggest a heightened awareness of potential external 
constitutional constraints, in respect of healthcare, given the contrast in parliamentary 
and journalistic comment on such constraints, over time, detected within this article. 
The search results, from Hansard and Proquest, revealed that there was no 
parliamentary and little journalistic acknowledgement of the potential constraints on 
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NHS policymaking imposed by GATS in the 1990s. Similarly, there was no 
acknowledgement, in parliamentary debates, of the potential constraints imposed by 
EU law in the 2000s, although some journalists acknowledged this. In contrast, the 
aforementioned search results indicate that many parliamentarians and journalists 
have acknowledged such potential constraints since 2010. Similarly, many 
parliamentarians, journalists and campaigners have acknowledged the potential 
constraints of TTIP and post-Brexit trade deals on NHS policymaking.  The internet, in 
particular social media, may have been important in heightening awareness as it 
enables campaigners to easily disseminate their messages widely. Campaigns 
against privatisation and the seeming heightened awareness of the potential 
constraints of transnational laws indicate that the strategies of juridification and new 
constitutionalism have not succeeded in naturalising market reforms to the NHS or 
weakened public solidarity concerning healthcare (although the institutions executing 
this principle are being undermined through underfunding and privatisation), thereby 
revealing limits to neo-liberal hegemony.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Markets have been idealised by successive governments in the neo-liberal era which 
have marketized and privatised the English NHS, thereby diverting money away from 
patient needs and undermining risk pooling and cross subsidy within the NHS. Such 
governments have employed strategies to attempt to naturalise their reforms. The 
NHS has been juridified as law, for example, contract law and EU public procurement 
and competition law, increasingly regulates NHS activity and resolves conflicts. 
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However, the activities of campaign groups indicate that although privatisation has 
become a technical legal matter, it is highly politicised, and differences in journalistic, 
parliamentary and public responses to potential external constitutional constraints, 
over time, suggest a heightened awareness of such restrictions. Consequently, the 
strategies of juridification and new constitutionalism appear to have failed to naturalise 
market reforms to the NHS, revealing limits to the hegemony of neo-liberalism and the 
endurance of public solidarity concerning healthcare.  
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